Is the gas industry a good neighbour? A comparison of UK and Australia experiences in terms of procedural fairness and distributive justice by Witt, Katherine et al.
Article
Is the gas industry a good neighbour? A 
comparison of UK and Australia experiences in 
terms of procedural fairness and distributive 
justice
Witt, Katherine, Whitton, John and Rifkin, Will
Available at http://clok.uclan.ac.uk/24326/
Witt, Katherine, Whitton, John ORCID: 0000-0001-6391-5740 and Rifkin, Will (2018) Is 
the gas industry a good neighbour? A comparison of UK and Australia experiences in 
terms of procedural fairness and distributive justice. The Extractive Industries and 
Society . ISSN 2214-790X  
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the work.
For more information about UCLan’s research in this area go to 
http://www.uclan.ac.uk/researchgroups/ and search for <name of research Group>.
For information about Research generally at UCLan please go to 
http://www.uclan.ac.uk/research/ 
All outputs in CLoK are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, including
Copyright law.  Copyright, IPR and Moral Rights for the works on this site are retained 
by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Terms and conditions for use 
of this material are defined in the http://clok.uclan.ac.uk/policies/
CLoK
Central Lancashire online Knowledge
www.clok.uclan.ac.uk
Manuscript Details
Manuscript number EXIS_2018_80_R1
Title Is the gas industry a good neighbour? A comparison of UK and Australia
experiences in terms of procedural fairness and distributive justice.
Short title Is gas a good neighbour?
Article type Research Paper
Abstract
Australia and the UK share much in common in their social, governance and legal systems. Would approaches to
unconventional oil and gas development also be similar? In this article, we examine the different experiences of local
communities regarding unconventional oil and gas development in Queensland, Australia and England, UK. We
question whether the onshore gas industry makes a ‘good neighbour’ in two different contexts that share one common
legal background. We consider procedural fairness within the context of land access processes and discourses of
individual and collective property rights generated by unconventional gas development in each country. Land access
policy and practice have developed significantly in Australia to recognise the rights of existing landholders, including
Traditional Owners, and in England, to clarify mineral and resource ownership rights. We consider distributive justice
within a conceptual framework of social sustainability relating to communities and local social impacts from
development. We review how governments at various levels have attempted to resolve such issues. We conclude that
the unconventional gas development experience is heavily context dependent and cannot be described by a simple
narrative, nor by snap-shot baseline and impact studies. We suggest that there remains much to be learned about
regulating the industry.
Keywords fracking; procedural fairness; distributive justice; land access; energy.
Taxonomy Social Science, Environmental Science
Corresponding Author Katherine Witt
Corresponding Author's
Institution
University of Queensland
Order of Authors Katherine Witt, John Whitton, Will Rifkin
Suggested reviewers Jeffrey Jacquet, Peta Ashworth, Julia Haggerty, Kathryn Brasier
Opposed reviewers Andrea Walton, Thomas Measham
Submission Files Included in this PDF
File Name [File Type]
Cover Letter-Gas a good neighbour- revised.docx [Cover Letter]
Response to Reviewers Good neighbour 24-9-18.docx [Response to Reviewers (without Author Details)]
HIghlights_Gas a good neighbour.docx [Highlights]
Title Page - Gas a good neighbour (1).docx [Title Page (with Author Details)]
Witt et al_Good neighbour_Resubmission_22-9_KW-WR-KW.docx [Manuscript (without Author Details)]
To view all the submission files, including those not included in the PDF, click on the manuscript title on your EVISE
Homepage, then click 'Download zip file'.
Centre for Coal Seam Gas The University of Queensland
Brisbane QLD 4072 Australia
T +61 7 3346 4101
F +61 7 3364 4045
E ccsg@uq.edu.au
W ccsg.centre.uq.edu.au
Centre for Coal Seam Gas
Level 8, Sir James Foots Building
Cnr College and Staffhouse Road
St Lucia QLD 4072 Australia
Director
Professor Andrew Garnett
CRICOS PROVIDER NUMBER 00025B
Date 24 September 2018
Editor/s
Extractive Industries and Society
Special Edition: ‘Social facets of fracking’
Dear Darrick and EI&S editors,
Re: Witt, Whitton and Rifkin article submission
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Response to Reviewers - Is Gas a Good Neighbour?
Reviewer 1
Nice work! The paper provides an interesting comparative analysis of regulatory environments that 
govern unconventional gas development in the UK and Australia. The focus on procedural fairness 
and distributive justice is very relevant given the importance of those two elements in community 
acceptance. The contextual similarities and differences influencing community outcomes are clearly 
outlined and analyzed.
Thank you.
Some statements would need to be substantiated and referenced. 
E.g P5: Regulatory responses in the UK have raised significant issues regarding democracy and 
fairness for communities impacted by shale gas exploration (Whitton et al 2017) inserted
 P8: Researchers have highlighted this tension between private property and public value and the 
extent to which citizens’ rights extend (Jacquet et al 2018) inserted
P6: Other regulatory responses in Australia: Need to ensure that it is clear which Australian 
jurisdiction you are referring to in this paragraph. 
Thank you. We refer to all levels here and have reworded to make it clearer. We have amended the 
text throughout so that it is clear we focus on experiences in Queensland and England.
Reviewer 2
This manuscript presents a comparison of Australian and UK cases in terms of procedural and 
distributive justice. The aim is to compare the specific features of each case and examine the lessons 
learned- specifically in terms of increasing the fairness and social sustainability of shale/coal seam 
gas. 
Though this Australia-UK comparison has potential merit, I found substantial problems with the 
manuscript, both in terms of the underlying conceptualisation and application. These issues should 
be addressed thoroughly before I can recommend publication. 
We have attempted to address all the following points and hope the changes are to your 
satisfaction.
One concern is that the concepts of “Australian” and “UK” unconventional oil and gas development 
are weakly defined. The majority of the discussion is on Queensland, but certain points about public 
participation for example relate to the state of Victoria (e.g. p.4 - which has a completely different 
take on the unconventional gas issue). As there is no single Australian policy position at the federal 
level, policy is made by the states. Queensland has a very different stance on development to 
Victoria. The authors therefore do some weaving in and out of different scales of governance to 
make different points about “Australia”. 
We have explained the different level of government more clearly and focussed the comparison on 
experiences in Queensland, where CSG has been developed. The reference to Victoria has been 
removed.
Similarly the UK focuses specifically on the English planning system as Scotland has a current ban and 
Wales an effective moratoria (no applications are currently being considered). Realistically this is an 
England-Queensland comparison, rather than UK-Australia and this is a more difficult governance 
comparison (country-to-state level). At least this needs to be clarified and better articulated 
throughout. 
We agree that the nature of this comparison needs to be made clearer.  We have endeavoured to do 
so with changes in text throughout, being more specific about which Australian state is the focus and 
how generalisations might be inferred from that comparison.
The underlying need for an ethical analysis of shale gas needs to be better established. Though there 
is a fair amount of relevant literature cited on the topic, various key sources on the issues of ethics 
and fairness specifically are missing. Evensen’s paper in Environmental Values, de Melo Martin et al. 
or Lignum et al. would be useful in setting up the need for an ethics/ justice-based analysis:
Evensen, D.T., 2015. Policy decisions on shale gas development ('fracking'): the insufficiency of 
science and necessity of moral thought. Environmental Values, 24(4), pp.511-534.
de Melo-Martín, I., Hays, J. and Finkel, M.L., 2014. The role of ethics in shale gas policies. Science of 
the total environment, 470, pp.1114-1119.
Dignum, M., Correljé, A., Cuppen, E., Pesch, U. and Taebi, B., 2016. Contested technologies and 
design for values: The case of shale gas. Science and engineering Ethics, 22(4), pp.1171-1191.
Thank you for noting these relevant pieces to be cited. We do not aspire to a full ethical analysis but 
have used these reference to justify the need and our use of the terms procedural fairness and 
distributive justice.
Similarly a range of country-down-to-county level analyses of environmental justice in relation to 
shale gas would be beneficial. Specifically those that already cover the UK in detail such as Cotton’s 
paper in Local Environment, or Lacey et al’s paper in JoCP on social contract in the Australian case 
are relevant:
Cotton, M., 2017. Fair fracking? Ethics and environmental justice in United Kingdom shale gas policy 
and planning. Local Environment, 22(2), pp.185-202.
Lacey, J. and Lamont, J., 2014. Using social contract to inform social licence to operate: an 
application in the Australian coal seam gas industry. Journal of Cleaner Production, 84, pp.831-839.
Thank you, we are familiar with this line of argument and will boost the referencing in this article.   
We have drawn on both Cotton and Lacey et al. We removed paragraphs on utilitarian theory and 
social welfare, etc so as not to give the impression of being a full ethical analysis.  We hope this more 
delineated approach works. 
Other papers are also of relevance, specifically Meng’s paper on ‘fracking justice’ or significant case 
studies in the USA
Meng, Q., 2018. Fracking equity: A spatial justice analysis prototype. Land Use Policy, 70, pp.10-15.
Fry, M., Briggle, A. and Kincaid, J., 2015. Fracking and environmental (in) justice in a Texas city. 
Ecological Economics, 117, pp.97-107.
Clough, E. and Bell, D., 2016. Just fracking: a distributive environmental justice analysis of 
unconventional gas development in Pennsylvania, USA. Environmental Research Letters, 11(2), 
p.025001.
Again, thank you for these relevant references. We can see there has been much done in this field 
with far more sophisticated analyses of ethics dimensions than the one presented here. Here, we 
have compared experiences of gas development in the different jurisdictions using the frames of PF 
and DJ, rather than attempting.
The methods section is misleading. On first reading I was unclear if this paper was reporting on 
primary research (based upon community-focussed fieldwork), or secondary analysis and reporting. 
It turns out it was the latter. This needs to be much clearer. I suggest removing this section and 
calling the paper what it is - a discussion/review paper rather than an empirical paper. It is an 
editorial decision therefore if a more discursive approach is suitable for the journal. 
We have rewritten with an explicit statement about being a secondary analysis to make this clearer. 
The paper includes insights from extensive empirical and ethnographic work in the Queensland 
context.  The insights on the UK are more conceptually based.  So, it is not either ‘empirical’ or ‘not-
empirical’; it is a hybrid. We have clarified that in the paper.  
The concepts of justice used in this paper are simplistic and incomplete. This requires substantial 
reworking before publication can be considered. 
We have reworked sections and acknowledge that we have only used elements of the concepts and 
stated that is not a full ethical analysis, rather a comparison of strategies developed to improve 
procedural fairness and distributive justice in relation to land access and cost/benefit distribution. 
We set about to ask and answer the question of whether gas can be a good neighbour? We 
recognise that being’ a good neighbour’ means satisfying expectations for procedural fairness and 
distributive justice, hence the use of these concepts as frames for comparison.
The concepts that needs work are:
Environmental justice - there is very little literature cited on what it is, and what the underlying 
concepts are that make something fair.  EJ is also commonly recognised as involving recognition-
based justice as well as procedural/distributive dimensions. This is not mentioned, and should be 
included in the analysis - David Schlosberg in particular. This requires substantial reworking and 
referencing. Specifically on pages 7 and 8 the discussion of procedural and distributive justice to set 
up the analysis, is very thinly defined. There is a rich literature on each, and the underlying ethical 
dimensions of these concepts (there are no citations of relevant literature in the definition of each).
A focus on environmental justice would take the paper in a direction different from the one 
intended.  A contribution of this paper is the rich empirical work from Queensland on economic and 
social effects of onshore gas development, reflecting more than five years of fieldwork. We have 
published little on that in the academic literature, though the data are widely referred to in the 
community, government, and industry sectors in the region.  Our social and economic analysis has 
been well received in international forums.  Environmental justice deserves greater attention, as you 
suggest, but again, it is not our focus in this paper. We have responded by reworking sections so as 
not to give the impression of this being a full treatment of environmental justice – which it clearly is 
not.
There is no mention of the emergent paradigm of energy justice (the work of Sovacool, McCauley, 
Jenkins etc.). This is relevant as it links issues of planning concerns with those of energy resource use 
and climate change (the interlink is mentioned but not discussed in detail here). 
That is a good link, thank you.  We have mentioned it in the concluding section of the paper as an 
area for further development.  
There’s no mention of the literature on energy sacrifice zones which is beneficial to understanding 
the ethics of distributive fairness inherent in resource extraction. 
Good point.  That aligns with the concepts that you introduced above about environmental justice 
and energy justice. We now refer to this area of focus as a ‘next step’ in the concluding section of 
the paper.  
There is no mention of social license to operate (and its critiques).
We are well immersed in the social license debates – conceptual and ‘real world’, but we decided 
not to open this can of worms for this piece, sticking instead to ‘community acceptance’.  As you 
note, however, the concept will emerge for readers.  So, we have included reference to social license 
with a note about its critiques in the paper.  
More specific issues
Page 1- the allusion to moral fibre is odd. Consider rephrasing. 
It was meant to infer the old agrarian notion of ‘country folk’ being morally superior to ‘city folk’ 
(which still persists in some places). That argument does not carry weight in this paper though, so 
has been deleted.  
Page 2 - procedural and distributive fairness are not technically ethical principles - they are ethical 
problems which would be resolved differently by applying different ethical principles (like 
highlighting welfare or duty for example). Justice as fair distribution is rather put in opposition to 
utilitarianism later on in the paper. But this is a simplistic dichotomy.
We chose to keep the ethical references simple and simplistic in this paper, as it is introducing 
concepts that many readers may not be entirely familiar with.  Nonetheless, we have improved the 
precision in our mentions in this piece.  Reference to utilitarian ethics is removed to avoid confusion.
Page 2- The expectation that community responses would be similar from the UK and Australia is an 
assumption - more substantial evidence is needed to back up this claim, given that there is now 
substantial empirical research on community shale gas responses in each country.
We have now qualified our mention of the expectation that community responses would be similar. 
It is all a question of what counts as ‘similar’, some would argue.  
Page 7 The authors argue that the UK is ambivalent to fracking - that is broadly true, but the 
Government’s own figures suggest that public acceptance is falling. I suggest the Energy and Climate 
Change Public Attitudes Tracker surveys for up to date figures to flesh out this ambivalence/falling 
support. I think waves 25 is the latest. The figures are very similar to those of the CSIRO study. 
Thank you. We have used the Wave 25 – what a wonderful resource! Ambivalence in UK remained 
the same as last year. In the UK, ambivalence appears to be related to lack of awareness and 
knowledge about the industry. The CSIRO study surveyed people living in the gasfields region, where 
we might expect them to have higher levels of knowledge and awareness. 
Page 7 - What is the justification for saying that Australia is more influenced by the US than the UK 
is? Clear statements by Coalition/Conservative government officials in the last 7 years have made 
clear that the UK intends to mirror the economic successes of the United States from shale gas. 
The main basis was the underlying model for granting petroleum licenses where the UK uses a 
European- originated model that tends to place controls over the pace of development (so can slow 
it down or speed it up as needed) and Australia adopted the US model which does not control the 
pace of development but allows market forces to alone to drive it.  We can see though, that modern 
planning policy is being more influenced by the US shale gas experience. We hope we have clarified 
this point.  The point is not so much about the level of influence as about the ability to see parallels.  
Australia has much more onshore gas exploration and development than the UK, and in that way, 
Australians are responding to gas development on our shores.  
Page 9 - the description of utilitarianism is simplistic. A more full definition is needed - this is a 
simple description of welfare utilitarianism (which is not the whole of utilitarian thought). 
Recognising that this requires quite a bit of explanation we decided to delete the section on 
utilitarian ethics and keep simply to the specific elements of justice delineated. 
Page 9 - The Mill reference needs a citation. 
Mill has also been deleted
Page 9 - Whitton 2018 needs a reference in the bibliography. 
Thank you. This has been amended
Page 17 - The conclusion that community visioning to achieve social sustainability is rather 
speculative. I am sceptical of the assertion that a method of public participation will automatically 
enhance dialogue and hence procedural justice. There are lots of participatory methods available 
which are similar in scope to the visioning process suggested, but these alone do not ensure justice. I 
contend that it is only through political commitments to share power through participatory means 
that this might be achieved. The method used should therefore be specific to decision/outcome at 
hand.
We have reworked the conclusion section, noting that community visioning is among many elements 
needed, but it is not sufficient alone. Thank you for your insights and recommendations. 
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Is the gas industry a good neighbour? A comparison of UK and Australia experiences in terms of 
procedural fairness and distributive justice.
Keywords: fracking, procedural fairness, distributive justice, land access, energy
Abstract
Australia and the UK share much in common in their social, governance and legal systems. Would 
approaches to unconventional oil and gas development also be similar? In this article, we examine 
the different experiences of local communities regarding unconventional oil and gas development in 
Queensland, Australia and England, UK.  We question whether the onshore gas industry makes a 
‘good neighbour’ in two different contexts that share one common legal background. 
We consider procedural fairness within the context of land access processes and discourses of 
individual and collective property rights generated by unconventional gas development in each 
country. Land access policy and practice have developed significantly in Australia to recognise the 
rights of existing landholders, including Traditional Owners, and in England, to clarify mineral and 
resource ownership rights.  We consider distributive justice within a conceptual framework of social 
sustainability relating to communities and local social impacts from development. We review how 
governments at various levels have attempted to resolve such issues.
We conclude that the unconventional gas development experience is heavily context dependent and 
cannot be described by a simple narrative, nor by snap-shot baseline and impact studies. We suggest 
that there remains much to be learned about regulating the industry.
1. Introduction and overview 
As a former British colony, Australia has inherited many of its governance structures from the UK. A 
history of British sovereignty has, to a large (although lessening) extent, defined Australia’s culture 
and society. That includes predominantly utilitarian attitudes toward land and natural resources, 
expectations of secure private property rights, and expectations of public participation in decisions 
about land use. In both the UK and Australia, though in different eras and at vastly different scales, 
agricultural production has been paramount to economic growth and prosperity, as well as 
producing food and fibre. However, in more recent times, rural landscapes in both countries have 
been expected to provide a much broader range of public goods and services, including carbon and 
water storage, rural amenity (particularly in the UK), biodiversity, and increasingly, energy. Given the 
shared history that shapes land use values, one might expect the development of unconventional 
gas industries in rural areas to follow similar paths. They may differ at different points on similar 
trajectories, though both countries are still at relatively early stages of development compared to 
the US or Canada. 
Despite the common expectation that rural landscapes in the UK and Australia will provide multiple 
benefits for multiple users, including energy supply, questions remain about how a new energy 
industry, such as unconventional gas, should make its entrance into existing socio-cultural and 
biophysical landscapes and how it can coexist alongside other land uses and land values. This last 
question about co-existence is particularly relevant since unconventional gas production typically 
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involves the use of private, often farmed, land by gas companies who have been granted a 
petroleum extraction license from the government (Curnow et al. 2017). With multiple parties 
having been ceded rights to the land, questions arise as to who should have agency in decisions 
about whether development should go ahead or not, what procedures are necessary to gain 
acceptance and whether what is done in one situation is applicable in another. We address these 
questions in relation to concepts of procedural fairness and distributive justice as key drivers of 
community acceptance and broader ‘social license1’of the industry (Lacey and Lamont 2014; Moffat 
and Zhang 2014). As the unconventional gas industry seeks to develop and expand, and with 
scientific uncertainties surrounding possible health and environmental impacts (de Melo-Martin et 
al. 2014; Keywood et al. 2018),there is an increasing need to understand and consider such justice-
based concerns in planning and land use decision making (Evensen 2015). 
Our conclusions about co-habiting the landscape fundamentally relate to the question, ‘Is the gas 
industry a good neighbour?’  We respond by examining and comparing experiences of the early 
stages of unconventional gas development in Australia and England, UK. IN these settings, one could 
expect, given the common political heritage and development pathways, government and 
community responses might also be following similar paths. To examine and compare experiences 
with land access and co-existence requires a focus on regions where some unconventional gas 
activity has already occurred. For this reason, we focus on England in the UK (Scotland has a ban and 
Wales has a moratorium on the process of fracking since 2015), and Queensland, Australia (most 
other Australian states have some form of moratorium in place).
2. Methods
This paper is based on secondary analysis and reporting of research and experiences with 
unconventional gas development. The Australian case material is drawn from academic and grey 
literature as well as public documents.  Additionally, the authors have been engaged in participatory 
social research in the arena over the past six years.  Participatory methods include interviews with 
key informants in ten towns on social and economic changes and internal tensions within each 
community.  Interview data are accompanied by analysis of 15-year trends in key social and 
economic indicators, ranging from housing costs and unemployment to business income and crime 
rates (CCSG 2017).  This rural fieldwork has been supplemented by extensive engagement in the 
state’s capital city of Brisbane.  That has occurred through ongoing interactions with staff, policy 
makers, and executives in the state government and the natural gas industry.  
We use England as a comparison and case study on which to apply learning from the fieldwork and 
analysis of literature in Australia. In England, shale gas exploration is at an early stage dominated by 
a polarized narrative of those either for or against - that is, those touting either the promises of 
economic prosperity or claiming procedural and environmental injustices. With this polarised 
narrative in mind, we have adopted a conceptual framework related to social sustainability as the 
1The term ‘social license’, while often used, is referred to hesitantly here as it has been criticised as being 
industry-centric and inferring a ‘tick-box’ approach rather than an ongoing and dynamic relationship between 
industry and community (Owen and Kemp 2012). Critiques indicate that it is too heavily reliant on an impetus 
to achieve consensus rather than being pursued in relation to justice-based theories of social contract (Lacey 
and Lamont 2014). 
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basis for a critical review of salient pieces of academic and grey literature review on shale gas 
planning and land access rights. To this body of work, we have analysed elements of procedural and 
distributive justice analysis, as recorded in Tables 2 and 3. This evidence helps to illustrate the 
fundamentally different views on what terms of reference the UK planning system2 should consider 
when processing shale gas planning applications and where agency for planning decisions should be 
based – with government or citizens. Such illustrates enable examining how the varying parties have 
“creatively constructed” the governance expectations and practices for their gas development 
reality (Whitton et al. 2015, 128). 
3. Contextual similarities and differences influencing community outcomes
Reflecting its history of British sovereignty, Australia follows the UK’s Westminster system of 
democratic governance in which local representativeness, choice and public participation are pillars 
for fair democratic processes. Planning laws in both the UK and Australia emphasise the importance 
of public participation in land use decision making, and both jurisdictions aim to balance the 
protection of private property rights with economic development to advance the public interest 
(Stokes 2012). In relation to unconventional gas development, public participation processes have an 
increasingly prominent role as they provide mechanisms for addressing conflict between different 
groups within society and opportunities for a wide range of interests to influence (albeit to varying 
degrees) the decision making process. However, while there is common agreement about the 
principle of public participation, there are differences between England and Australia and within 
each country in the ways that it is implemented, particularly in relation to local planning processes 
and in the granting of petroleum licenses. Indeed, inadequate public participation is often seen as a 
major contributing factor in social conflict over land and resource use generally (Innes and Booher 
2004), and more recently in relation to shale gas (North et al. 2014) and other energy projects 
(Cuppen 2018).
1.1.The role of local government and public participation in planning
In Australia, land use planning is the responsibility of the individual states. Where triggered, it is also 
subject to laws from the central government protecting the environment and cultural values. As a 
result, approaches to land use planning can and do differ. Queensland, where CSG development 
received government support, has a relatively “top-down” approach to planning, at least where 
significant projects are concerned. The Queensland government states it will work “closely” with 
local governments to develop land within pre-identified “priority development areas” (Queensland 
Government 2017). However, it does not provide measures to increase local capacity, consensus-
building, or decision-making powers. In this model, the Queensland government determines areas 
where development would significantly advance what they designate as the public interest.  It then 
engages in public “consultation” activities that are characterised by critics as mostly geared toward 
placating opposition and gaining local consensus for the proposed development (Luke et al. 2014; 
Espig and de Rijke 2016). 
2For a summary of the differences between planning systems in England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and 
Wales, see House of Commons (2016). 
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The UK has been on a trajectory of reducing the central government’s role in planning and increasing 
the powers and autonomy of local governments and local communities (Stokes 2012).  However, a 
review of UK shale gas governance (Whitton et al. 2017) concluded that the opportunities for public 
and community interests to be involved in shale gas decision-making are limited and frustrated by a 
sluggish county-level planning system. For example, Lancashire County councillors rejected planning 
consent for Cuadrilla’s application to drill and frack a total of eight wells at two sites in Lancashire.  
The decision was rationalised on the grounds that the well pads and equipment would have an 
unacceptable visual impact and create too much noise. However, the company’s appeals against 
these rulings look to take the decision away from local representatives to national government 
ministers and the Secretary of State as noted by Rattle et al. (2018) and Szolucha (2018).
A comparison of approaches in relation to unconventional gas development shows how the voice 
and role of local (county) governments has been overpowered by higher levels of government in 
both jurisdictions. 
Public input into decisions about resource development in Australia – i.e., project approval for CSG 
development – occurs through broader democratic processes of voting for a political party in state 
government elections and through ‘community consultation’ required in formulating an 
environmental or social impact assessment.  Public input into operational decisions once 
development licenses are in place can occur, at least in Queensland, through community 
consultation committees, which have been required by conditions for project approval from the 
Coordinator-General’s office (what is referred to as ‘conditioning’ a project).  Companies were also 
conditioned to conduct quarterly opinion surveys during their first five years of development, to 
keep registers of complaints by local residents and other stakeholders, and to negotiate for land 
access from landholders. This last item is a significant and ongoing area of concern, which we will 
expand on below. 
3.2 Private property rights and the granting of petroleum licenses
While expectations for landholders’ private property rights are similar in Australia and the UK, the 
rights granted to petroleum licensees are quite different. The UK follows the ‘North Sea’ model for 
granting petroleum licenses, which retains high levels of government control over the scale and pace 
of development. Australia follows the ‘North American’ model, which gives more autonomy to gas 
companies and allows market forces to determine the scale and pace of development (Hunter 2014). 
In both countries, onshore exploration for oil and gas requires a license. The license grants exclusive 
exploration rights (i.e., to drill boreholes and conduct testing) to develop oil and gas production. The 
rights granted by a “landward licence” do not include access rights – that is the right to access the 
land surface and potentially also water resources below which the resource might reside.  The 
licensee is required to obtain other consent under current legislation, including necessary planning 
permissions from appropriate local authorities (Whitton et al. 2017). This process is similar in 
Australia, where the licensee must gain consent from the landowner for land access, although the 
landowner does not have the right to withhold consent, without taking the matter to court. 
In the UK, underground mineral and petroleum resources are owned by the Crown Estate. The 
process of exploring and extracting these resources is governed by a system of national laws. 
Changes to trespass law were included in an Act of Parliament in 2015 (Government 2015) to enable 
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oil and gas developers to access from neighbouring land underground resources that are over 300 
metres beneath an individual’s property. That is despite 99 percent of 40,647 responses to a 
consultation on the proposed changes being in opposition to the development (DECC 2015). Section 
43 of the Infrastructure Act 2015 provides that there is now a right to drill for oil or gas at a depth of 
300 metres or more below the surface. That removes the need to gain consent from the landowner 
to access land at this depth or below and essentially permits hydraulic fracturing to occur below 
private property without the landowner’s consent. For access to resources less than 300 metres 
below the land surface, the onus remains in shale gas operators to acquire landowner consent and 
to agree on appropriate compensation.
Arguments for these changes to the law included the mitigation of lengthy delays to exploratory 
activity and the costly and time-consuming legal processes resulting from public opposition activity. 
In recognition of collective landscape values, the UK Government has stated within draft regulations 
(Government 2015) that hydraulic fracturing must take place at a depth more than 1,200 metres 
below protected areas such as National Parks, Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty, the Broads and 
World Heritage sites. This limit is qualified by stating that drinking water is not normally found at 
depths below 400 metres (DECC 2015). At present, the approach of the UK has demonstrated 
elements of bipolarity, with government support for such resource development being explicit 
alongside a requirement for strict regulation and awareness of potential environmental impacts.
Underground resources in Australia also belong to ‘the Crown’. In practice, the individual state 
governments receive royalties from the development of such resources and grant rights to explore 
and to develop them, including rights to access private land to extract those resources.  The lack of 
landholders’ rights in this process has been the subject of strong opposition from affected 
communities, which we discuss further in this article. 
While the Australian federal government at the time remained quiet on the issue of unconventional 
gas development, the Queensland state government provided financial incentives similar to those 
for the UK (Towler et al. 2016) to support the oil and gas industry in launching the CSG mega 
projects. Development was then spurred by a surge in gas prices. 
3.3 Government and regulatory responses 
Regulatory responses to planning applications for shale gas developments in the UK have raised 
significant issues regarding democracy and fairness for communities impacted by shale gas 
exploration. Rattle et al. (2018) and Szolucha (2018) provide examples in Lancashire and Yorkshire. 
To summarize, the views of local people against shale gas development were essentially ignored by 
central government by overruling local government decisions against shale gas developments. 
Whitton et al. (2017) argue that such decisions are all the more controversial given the UK 
Government policy commitment to ‘localism’. 
In Australia, the population is highly urbanised, with over two-thirds of the national population living 
in the seven state capital cities (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017).  A perceived lack of democratic 
voice for rural and regional residents in public (and particularly environmental) policy making is 
often raised as an issue (Mercer-Mapstone et al. 2018).  Perhaps because of this sensitivity, there is 
arguably more attention given to local voice in Australia than in the UK.  This attention is evident by 
the number of public inquiries and reviews into unconventional gas development commissioned by 
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various governments and agencies across Australia (currently at 14). Most of these reviews have the 
explicit intent to give local people a voice, with inquiries accepting public input, such as via hearings 
and submissions. Most of these inquiries have been conducted following the development of 
unconventional gas in Queensland, where formal avenues for local voice could be seen to be limited, 
e.g. through public consultation by consultancy firms during formulation of environmental and social 
impacts assessment that companies filed with the State’s Coordinator-General prior to project 
approval. Other states have taken a very different approach to Queensland and, largely based on 
public opposition, have placed moratoria or bans on the practice of hydraulic fracturing.
In Queensland, the industry has been increasingly regulated by through legislative and policy 
changes, but initially, through the approvals process. Project proponents are required to submit 
detailed environmental impact assessment, which must include a social impacts assessment and a 
social impact management plan (SIMP). Within the SIMP, conditions are placed on the operations of 
the project to address concerns about distributive justice, in relation to workforce planning and 
accommodation (with recent prohibition of 100% external workforces for all resource development), 
conditions on the location and longevity of temporary workers camps, local content quotas for local 
procurement of goods and services, and the requirement to build local skills and quotas for 
Indigenous and female employees.  A proportion of royalties paid to the state government on the 
sale of resources are distributed to all communities in the state, channelled through a competitive 
grants process.
Commonalities and differences in the two jurisdictions are recounted in Table 1. One should note 
that, in Australia (Queensland), coal seam gas was initially developed in rural areas (exploration 
activities closer to urban settlements were strongly opposed), where fewer people are directly 
affected.
Table 1. Contextual commonalities and differences that influence experiences of unconventional 
gas development
Context UK (England) Australia (Queensland)
Population density
Location of gas projects
271 people per square km
in rural and semi-rural areas
3 people per km2(2.8 /km2)
Wells mainly in rural areas
(some in NSW, where exclusion 
zones were introduced with a  
2km buffer zone around them- 
adopted as voluntary best 
practice by some companies in 
Queensland)
Petroleum licensing ‘North Sea’ model – maintain 
government control over scale 
and pace of development
‘North American’ model - low 
government intervention; free 
market determines scale and 
pace of development
Private property rights Rights to ‘exclusive use’ 
challenged and continue to be 
challenged; e.g., trespass laws 
changed to allow access at 
300m depth without surface 
owner’s consent
Rights to ‘exclusive use’ 
challenged but clarified with the 
development of a land access 
code of practice with dispute 
resolution mechanisms. 
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Role of local government in 
project approvals and 
planning
Increasing powers and 
autonomy to local government 
(but capacity issues)
Central planning ‘working with’ 
local governments
Regulation Local powers can be usurped
Unpopular laws supporting the 
industry instated
Conditions on projects to seek 
and respond to community 
interests.
Table 1’s summary of key contextual similarities and differences suggests that some similarities can 
be seen to be rooted in a shared history. There are also differences attributable to geography (e.g., 
Australia’s lower population density) and governmental responses that reflect the relative intensity 
of onshore resource development in recent history, i.e., more mining development in Australia. We 
now explore how these differences influence experiences of community acceptance of 
unconventional gas development in the two countries. 
3.4 Community acceptance of unconventional gas development
In the UK, the development of shale gas resources has been slow and relatively small in scale. The 
‘shale gas revolution’ can at present be seen to be firmly located in North America, whilst the UK is 
being seen as a litmus test for Europe (Bradshaw and Waite 2017). Despite significant national and 
local media coverage, predominantly associated with the process of permissions (‘the planning 
process’), protests have been modest and often localised to shale gas exploration sites. 
As others have pointed out, the UK public appears to be largely ambivalent in its views toward shale 
gas development, but it perceives more risks than benefits (Whitmarsh et al. 2015). This conclusion 
is, according to surveys predominantly of those who live outside the zones of development. This 
result echoes the strongly negative voice that we have observed in the media and activist 
movements in Australia’s urban areas, far from where gas development occurs.
Other public perception studies (Williams et al. 2017) highlight concerns regarding trustworthiness 
of institutional and government actors involved in the shale gas industry and the lack of transparent 
and democratic decision making – significant for our discussion later on social sustainability. These 
authors and others identify a dominant discourse where policy approaches are defined through a 
deficit model of public understanding of science (Evensen 2015). Within this frame of reference, a 
technical approach to feasibility and safety is seen as sufficient grounds for good policymaking 
(Williams et al. 2017).  This positive technological assessment echoes the conclusions of the 
numerous public inquiries into the onshore gas industry in Australia, that any technical risks can be 
mitigated to acceptable levels (e.g., NSW Chief Scientist & Engineer 2014; Scientific Inquiry into 
Hydraulic Fracturing in the Northern Territory 2018).  Despite these findings, the public acceptability 
of unconventional gas development remains the subject of much debate in Australia (Luke et al. 
2014; Espig and de Rijke 2016). Whilst UK citizens have described as largely ambivalent toward the 
industry, recent surveys suggest the ambivalence may be waning, as awareness of the industry 
grows (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (DBEIS) 2018). 
Likewise in Australia, there is growing ‘anti-fracking’ sentiment, particularly in the urban centres 
removed from that development.  The shift in attitudes can be seen in media coverage of CSG 
development in Queensland. Initially, media focussed on regional economic benefits (Mitchell and 
Angus 2016), including jobs and growth.  However, from 2010-11, the media coverage changed its 
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tone, corresponding with release of the US anti-fracking film - Gasland, the emergence of the 
Australian protest movement – ‘Lock the Gate’, and Queensland government approval of four CSG-
to-liquid natural gas (LNG) megaprojects (Makki 2015).  
During the CSG construction period, a 2014 survey of attitudes toward CSG development in affected 
communities found that most people either “tolerated” or “accepted” CSG, about a quarter 
“embraced” it, and fewer than 10 percent “rejected” the industry outright. However, when repeated 
in 2016 (after the construction period had ended), there was general tendency to more negative 
views although the majority still either “tolerated” or “accepted” the development (CSIRO 2016). 
Public opinion about CSG development in Queensland is split, both in the agricultural regions of 
Queensland where the CSG is being developed and in the capital city of Brisbane, 200 kilometres 
away (Gillespie et al. 2016). The authors found that distrust of CSG companies was highest among 
rural landholders, exceeding 80 per cent, while residents in communities close to CSG development 
were evenly split between feelings of trust and distrust.  There are also significant levels of distrust 
(one-third of those surveyed) in the government’s ability to regulate the industry adequately 
(Gillespie et al. 2016), a finding that mirrors findings from the UK surveys.
There is also a 50-50 split in views among landholders with CSG infrastructure on their property of 
the industry’s ability to operate generally within their contractual guidelines (Cavaye et al. 2017).  
More specifically, half of farmers claim that they are breaking even financially or gaining additional 
income from CSG development on their property. Half say that they are losing money due to land 
out of production and time spent fixing problems created by CSG crews, such as replacing fences or 
closing gates (Cavaye et al. 2017).  
Community acceptance of unconventional gas in Queensland, Australia and England, UK can be seen 
to be shaped by similar expectations for democratic processes, involving fair and transparent 
decision making with acceptable avenues for public participation.  Also in common are low levels of 
trust in government and industry to consider adequately a range of community and environmental 
values. Drawing from Evensen (2015), we focus on these aspects as elements of ‘procedural 
fairness’.  We recognise that a general definition of procedural fairness would include other 
elements as well.
There are also low expectations for benefit sharing across geographic scales. That is, there may be 
national benefits, but there are questions about whether they will be shared appropriately with the 
localities where development occurs. These questions we compare and discuss as elements of 
‘distributive justice’ (Evensen 2015), again recognising that distributive justice includes others 
elements as well. 
Both England and Australia have been heavily influenced by US experiences of shale gas, which 
assessment of the media suggests continues to dominate the thinking and discourse. Experiences of 
unconventional gas development in Australia appear to be more influenced by the US experience 
than the UK has been to date.  The UK seems to be torn between a European philosophy of oil and 
gas development (the ‘North Sea’ model) that favours centralised control and moderated 
development with strong protection for cultural and environmental heritage values in landscapes, 
and more recent US influences that encourage development according to market forces with greater 
local government autonomy.
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Attitudes to unconventional gas development in Queensland, Australia and England, UK reflect 
experiences that provide a rich source of data for exploring further two key dimensions of 
community acceptance, or social license to operate (Moffat and Zhang 2015). In this comparison, we 
will focus on (1) experiences and discourses relating to land rights and land access as elements of 
procedural fairness and (2) discourses and experiences relating to the distribution of benefits and 
costs and its implications for social sustainability, in terms of economic wellbeing and retaining social 
capital.
2. Procedural fairness in relation to land access
There has been increasing research interest in the complex ethical dimensions of unconventional gas 
development with much academic work done already (see for example Lacey and Lamont 2014; 
Cotton 2016; Evensen 2017). For local citizens, procedural fairness is about having opportunities to 
participate in decision making, having their voice heard and concerns addressed, having enough 
relevant information to be able to participate fully, seeing transparency in industry operations and 
decision making, and addressing power imbalances between gas companies and landowners (Cotton 
2014; Evensen 2015). Here, we examine these elements of procedural fairness in relation to land 
access processes and discourses of individual rights (such as exclusivity, privacy) and collective rights 
(such as energy security, landscape amenity, environmental protection) generated by 
unconventional gas development in each country.
4.1 Debates about land access in the UK
In the absence of widespread drilling for onshore gas in the UK, we reflect on processes for and 
discourse around property rights and land access from the different perspectives of broadly those 
who support shale gas development and those against. This reflection requires some initial 
conceptual definition. 
The term land or property “access”, when used with reference to natural resource extraction, is 
often under-theorized and poorly defined(Ribot and Peluso 2003).We use a simple definition of land 
access, borrowed from Ribot and Peluso (2003), which refers to the process of negotiating who gets 
the use of what and under which circumstances (Ribot and Peluso 2003). “Use” is defined as the 
enjoyment of some kind of benefit (Hunt 1998). In this specific context, the benefits in question are 
derived from underground access to gas reserves. 
We previously discussed the legal and regulatory processes by which unconventional gas developers 
gain rights to drill on privately owned land. However, the law, whether based on or in an oral 
tradition, formal or customary, can never completely delineate all of the modes and pathways of 
resource access along complex and overlapping webs of power. In recognition of this complexity 
Schlager and Ostrom (2012) conceptualise property ownership as a “bundle of rights” that can be 
disaggregated and re-bundled as circumstances require. This “bundling” conceptualisation is 
relevant to natural resource management where access to different types of resources may be 
sought by different (individual and collective) actors. Schlager and Ostrom (2012) usefully distinguish 
between Authorised Users, Claimants, and Owners as having rights of access to resources. Of 
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interest to us is the apparently increasing role of Claimants through what Ribot and Peluso (2013) 
have termed “socially acknowledged and supported claims or rights”. 
As the authors  point out, NGOs and other movements of opposition through the concept of the 
‘Global Commons’ have successfully shaped a climate change narrative that influences frameworks 
for resource access in the name of environmental protection. This shift is not without reason. The UK 
Government has made much of the collective benefits of shale gas production -citing employment 
opportunities, lucrative leasing deals and compensation payments to communities despite concerns 
that these benefits come at the expense of property rights of individuals (Short and Szolucha 2017). 
These authors cite the example of the UK Government proposal to allocate financial incentives for 
local councils and a 1 percent share of the production revenues to local communities (UK. DECC 
2014) while simultaneously working to remove the right of property owners to be notified of 
planned fracking activities under their land. However, whilst the law is now clear regarding shale gas 
exploration and land access – the surface landowner must give permission; those who oppose shale 
gas exploration argue that the planning process associated with shale gas exploration is procedurally 
unfair. 
For those who support shale gas development, the public good of allowing access to gas resources is 
the contribution to energy security in the UK energy mix that is a cleaner source of energy than coal 
(Whitton 2018). Beyond this narrative of wider collective benefits, for individual citizens and 
affected communities, the benefits are harder to identify. There are currently no compensation 
schemes in place for either landowner or the community as a whole. In the UK Government 2016 
Budget, the Government announced the creation of a Shale Gas Wealth Fund as a mechanism to 
enhance distributional justice. 
In sum, the land access debate in England, UK appears to focus on the processes of negotiating 
whether and how an onshore gas industry can and should enter the landscape. In contrast, the 
discourse in Queensland, where the industry already has a significant footprint, focuses on processes 
to disclose how the industry is operating and how it might enter new areas.
4.2 Land access processes in Australia
As in the UK, rights of private property holders to “exclusive use and enjoyment” of their land have 
been consistently challenged by the “bundle of rights” approach. This approach acknowledges the 
co-existent rights of non-owners (Schlager and Ostrom 1992) as the collective rights of mainly urban-
based ‘claimants’ are formally recognised in land use policy. For some landholders in Queensland, 
the granting of petroleum licences over their land, establishes gas companies as Authorised Users 
with rights of (negotiated) access and use. That has been a further erosion of private property rights 
(Turton 2015).  In an attempt to balance landholders’ rights to exclusive use with CSG development 
activities, the Queensland government developed specific procedures governing land access 
negotiations with a government body established ostensibly to protect the rights of landholders – 
the Gas Fields Commission Queensland.  
While private landholders have no right of veto against development, newly developed land access 
regulations require that a land access agreement, including a conduct and compensation agreement 
(CCA), must be negotiated with the landholder before entering private property.  A land access 
agreement outlines the terms of access, including when and where access is permitted, how 
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permitted activities must be conducted and the amount and method for compensation payments. 
The land access agreement is attached to the title of the land and is binding on subsequent 
landholders. For informed consent, the process for negotiating a CCA begins with the petroleum 
licensee providing a notice of intent to negotiate to the landholder, explaining the nature and 
scheduling of the proposed activities. 
Negotiation of the CCA typically involves land-access agents and lawyers on behalf of the gas 
company and legal representation for the landowner. In recognition of the difference in financial 
resources between landowner and gas company, the company must pay for the landowner’s lawyer, 
unless the two sides fail to reach agreement and sign a contract.  If there is a failure to reach 
agreement, both parties can proceed to the recently appointed Ombudsman, free of charge, until an 
agreement is made.  This provision though, places a financial constraint on a landholder’s ability to 
resist the legal right of the gas company to access their land.  In a general sense, one can see 
elements of procedural fairness, but the ability to gain certain outcomes is still limited by economic 
factors.  
CCAs are negotiated on a case-by-case basis – there is no standard compensation amount.  
Embedded confidentiality clauses prevent landholders from divulging the terms of their agreements 
to others. In terms of both procedural fairness and distributive justice, the lack of transparency has 
resulted in significant differences in the amounts of compensation per well that landholders have 
received, with average agreements estimated at between $2,500 per year (AgForce, personal 
communication) to $10,000 per year (APPEA, personal communication).  The secrecy surrounding the 
size of compensation payments has fostered suspicion and anxiety. That has been compounded by 
the rapid pace of CSG development that was observed, meaning that landholders reported feeling 
pressured to make decisions quickly. Cumulative psycho-social “stress” associated with negotiating 
land access agreements (as well as managing the effects of severe drought) are difficult to quantify, 
but they are cited by individuals in the community, government, and industry to be the most visible 
health impact of CSG development (Rifkin et al. 2017).  
To address imbalances in capacity and information access among landholders, the leading 
agricultural industry group in the area ‘AgForce,’ has conducted a program of workshops to provide 
information and to build landholders’ capacities to negotiate with CSG companies. The AgForce 
workshops are supported by interests across the spectrum – by their own membership funds as well 
as significant grants from the GasFields Commission Queensland and the oil and gas industry’s peak 
body, the Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association (APPEA).  To date, these 
workshops have reached hundreds of landholders out of more than 5,000 potentially affected 
landholders in the region.  This multi-party support is worth noting as it relies on combined support 
from the oil and gas industry, the government regulator – who has been viewed with distrust by the 
invited participants, and a farm lobby group that had made early statements against CSG 
development. 
In a general sense of procedural fairness, there are provisions in Queensland law and practice for 
“fair” negotiations.  However, one also needs to consider the capacity to negotiate – the knowledge 
and the time as well as the financial resources, as noted above.  These constraints can be doubly 
restricting during times of drought, as was felt in Queensland in the years leading up to the launch of 
CSG development.  
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To regulate for procedural fairness, the Land Access Code was developed in Queensland in 2010.  It 
has evolved over time to better clarify the roles and responsibilities of both landholders and gas 
companies and strengthen the rights of landholders by providing freely accessible dispute resolution 
mechanisms.  There have also been provisions for “make good” agreements where resource 
activities have negatively impacted landholder use of water resources, in particular (Jacquet et al. 
2018). Although predetermining what is to be negotiated and the requirement to negotiate, the 
code does not regulate the negotiation process itself. A recent study on the actual processes of land 
access negotiations found that concerns about procedural fairness remain a major issue for 
landholders (Curnow et al. 2017), particularly in relation to imbalances of power. 
In Australia, unconventional gas companies must also negotiate with Aboriginal parties who formally 
or informally hold native title or cultural heritage rights and interests in the area proposed for 
development. Formally recognised native title rights holders can negotiate an Indigenous Land Use 
Agreement (ILUA) and are entitled to benefits arising from the development (Trigger et al. 2014). 
Providing procedural fairness for these groups remains a challenge for gas companies and 
governance bodies.
Table 2: Comparison of aspects of procedural fairness 
Procedural fairness 
elements
(Land Access)
England, UK Queensland, Australia 
Disclosure and 
information
Citizen access to information 
incorporated in United Nations 
Economic Commission for 
Europe’s 1998 Aarhus 
Convention. In England, 
supported by legislative changes 
to public access of information 
[e.g. Access to Information Act 
1985, the Freedom of 
Information Act (FoIA) 2000 and 
Environmental Information 
Regulations (EIR) 2004].
‘Informed consent’- Companies 
must provide prior information 
about when, where and what 
activities will take place.
Confidentiality clauses on Land 
Access agreements limit 
information sharing among 
landholders
Dispute resolution 
mechanisms
Agreement and compensation 
mechanism for land access and 
exploration up to 300m below 
ground.
Once agreement (and 
compensation) in place, difficult – 
but not impossible - to adjust if 
unforeseen impacts emerge
Recent appointment of a Gasfields 
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman 
has the power to investigate and 
assess the administrative practices 
and procedures of all government 
departments, local governments 
and public authorities
Participation and 
communication
Negotiated bilateral agreements 
between landholders and 
developer (unless access at 
300m or deeper)
Legal requirement for public 
consultation during planning 
The mandatory Land Access Code 
(2016) outlines best practice for 
how parties should communicate, 
consult and negotiate to maintain 
effective working relationships, but
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application process in England. 
Local Authority and developers 
not required to respond to 
consultees
Participation extends to public 
meetings where plans are 
discussed – public are not 
involved in decision making
Inequalities remain in capacity to 
negotiate and in information about 
planned activities
Impartiality Policy platform of  “going all out 
for shale” Cotton (2016)
State government-based CSG 
Compliance Unit as impartial 
compliance monitoring of industry
Third party rights Those opposed claim collective 
rights to ‘Global Commons’ 
(such as climate change and 
environmental protection). 
These rights influence land 
access but have little to no 
standing. 
Land access negotiations are 
bilateral agreements between 
company-landholder, or company-
Traditional Owner - no 
opportunities for affected 
community involvement. Third 
party claims made through political 
protest.
Both the UK and Australia have seen an increasing role of Claimants in discourse about property and 
access to resources. Their claims of collective rights to resources, such as Global Commons and 
landscape amenity are influencing the relationship between Owners and Authorised Users (i.e., 
landholders and gas companies). In Australia, there are perhaps more mature policies for addressing 
issues of “fairness” in land access, but these policies remain focussed on the bilateral relationship 
between gas companies and landholders.  Further, the policies rely on technical and business 
aspects, such as the placement of wells and compensation, rather than on facilitating relationships 
of co-existence or moral considerations of justice, which are highlighted as necessary by Evensen 
(2015).
3. The distribution of impacts on land, landscape and community
Unconventional gas development has been shown to produce a range of impacts that can be 
experienced at local, regional and national scales (Jacquet and Kay 2014). As Been (1994) has 
pointed out, the benefits that natural resource exploration produce typically are diffused throughout 
society, while their costs and risks are concentrated on a relatively small group of neighbours. We 
will not repeat this general discussion on distributive justice relating to shale gas, as it has been 
offered elsewhere, (Evensen and Stedman 2016) and (Evensen 2017).Rather, we focus on a 
comparison of the experiences of unconventional gas development in England, UK and Queensland, 
Australia in terms of the distribution of impacts relating to land, landscape and, by default, 
associated communities and neighbours. 
5.1 Queensland impacts
In Queensland, annual reporting of social and economic indicators shows that there were clear 
economic benefits for locally affected towns in terms of jobs creation, increased average wages, and 
total business income during the three-year construction phase (CCSG 2017). However, it appears 
that the distribution of opportunities can vary according to town size, capability and previous 
exposure to large scale projects (CCSG 2017). 
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Table 3 outlines the type and nature of impacts experienced in Queensland to illustrate the 
imbalance between impacts and opportunities at sales of land versus landscapes.
Impact Land Landscape/community
Economic- employment 
opportunities
Increased opportunities for ‘off-
farm’ work or second income for 
landholders. 
Some opportunities for 
landholders to provide services, 
e.g. well maintenance, cartage.
Unemployment in affected 
communities dropped to below 2% 
during peak construction activities 
(CCSG 2017).
Local skills shortages. Average 
wage and salaries increased 
(CCSG 2017)
Direct employment relied mostly on 
non-resident workforce- either 
drive in and out or fly in and out.
Mostly male, with efforts to 
increase diversity (Indigenous and 
female participation)
Economic-local 
procurement
Landholders may sell source 
material such as sand and gravel, 
or buy treated produced water to 
increase farm productivity.
Local procurement conditions but 
some misconceptions about 
definitions of “local” 
Industry-funded local skills building 
programs and apprenticeships
Economic - housing Properties with wells values may 
decrease (or increase if wells 
provide an income stream)
Rents doubled to tripled in some 
towns; house sale prices doubled. 
Lag time for new building 
approvals and construction left an 
oversupply of housing following the 
construction activity and since, 
both rents and house prices have 
plummeted in the most affected 
towns (CCSG 2017).
Social-Traffic Increased traffic on otherwise 
quiet rural properties disturbed 
landholders, but also disturbed 
privacy and caused concerns 
about safety of children and 
animals (Cavaye et al. 2017).
Traffic infringements notices 
increased significantly, partly due 
to increased volumes of traffic but 
also increased police presence 
(CCSG 2017)
Heavy vehicle traffic through 
towns- parents concerned about 
children walking/cycling to school 
(Rifkin et al. 2015)
Social- Diversity Concerns about biosecurity with 
traffic and overseas visitors
Temporary migrant workers used 
to fill some unskilled labour 
shortages.  Increased cultural 
diversity.
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“Outsiders” in town were mostly 
welcomed but some feelings of lost 
social identity in towns that 
identified as “agricultural”, now full 
of “high-vis” work uniforms.
Social- crime and safety Concerns for property security 
with increased traffic and 
“strangers” on the property
Instances of opportunistic theft 
rose in some local communities. 
Theft was thought to be mostly 
from unlocked work vehicles.
Fear of assault from predominantly 
male “strangers” stopped women 
from jogging at night. (There was 
no corresponding evidence of 
increase in sexual assault CCSG 
2017)
Social -infrastructure New gates, driveway access, 
tracks and fences as part of 
compensation agreement.  
Compensation may enable a 
swimming pool or new fencing 
and equipment to save 
landholders time and effort.
Regional and local road upgrades, 
waste water treatment facility 
upgrades, sporting facilities 
upgrades, new housing, 
community groups facilities and 
grants for new equipment, events 
sponsorship.
An assessment for the UK that is similar to that given above is not possible as the gas development 
there is not as advanced. That said, measures to address issues around the distribution of potential 
impacts have been addressed in England.     
5.2 Strategies to address issues of fairness in impact distribution
We now examine strategies taken in England, UK and Queensland, Australia to address issues of 
fairness in the distribution of impacts and benefits.  In the UK, the recently published Shale Wealth 
Fund (SWF) consultation document (Treasury 2016) from the UK Government states that local 
communities should have more control in local decisions, stating  “the government believes in 
empowering local people, and wants to see communities and individuals have greater control of the 
decisions, assets, and services which affect them” (ibid: 5). 
The Shale Wealth Fund document briefly presents a number of options for decision-making bodies 
for consultation and comment and includes provisions of economic compensation and benefits, for 
example:
1. Utilising an existing body in the local community (e.g., Parish or District Council), to 
administer funds. 
2. Utilising an existing body to administer industry community benefits schemes
3. Establish an independent decision-making body to administer local level funding.
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The SWF is promoted as a fund that “could deliver up to £1 billion of funding” (ibid: 3), a portion of 
which could be directed toward local communities, thereby sharing “the benefits of shale 
developments” (ibid).
Whilst focusing on distribution of the financial benefits of shale gas development, the document 
specifically proposes elements of procedural fairness and democratic governance - such as 
participation, equity and representation.  It suggests that local community representation should be 
reflected by those selected as decision-makers, and that local residents should be “as directly 
involved in decision-making as possible” (Treasury 2016, 13). However, as discussed earlier with 
reference to Short and Szolucha (2017), these benefits come at the expense of property rights of 
individuals. Also, this local decision making has proved not to be the case; instead, Government has 
simply ignored such promises (Whitton et al. 2017).
In Queensland, fairness in the distribution of impacts and benefits was primarily addressed through 
conditions placed on projects to force investment in local communities as part of the approval 
process.  Conditions include mandatory requirements for local employment and local procurement 
as well as direct community investment. 
Additionally, there were industry and government strategies to employ Aboriginal staff and to 
support Aboriginal enterprises.  Some companies provided additional community investment, such 
as construction of housing for all of their staff who were permanently based in a community.  The 
intent there was to decrease the stress on the local housing market. That stress could be seen in one 
town where weekly rents nearly tripled, a result consistent with the resource boom-bust cycles 
found in other regions (Jacquet and Kay 2014). 
At the landscape scale, CSG companies contributed to boosting civic infrastructure. Their 
investments included construction of a new community centre, building a community swimming 
pool, constructing a trade-training centre at a local school, and co-funding construction of roads and 
a new sewage treatment facility (QGC 2016).  These community investments were guided by a 
company’s consultation with key stakeholders, such as in local government, as well as via regular 
meetings of community consultation committees, and by appointed members of a community 
investment panel.   So, one can see here, as in the UK, elements of procedural fairness being 
observed in relation to addressing concerns about distributional justice.  
Annual reporting on the socio-economic changes in gasfields communities shows an average 3 to 5-
fold increase in total business income in CSG affected communities during the three-year period of 
construction of CSG pipeline infrastructure (CCSG 2017). However, residents believed that only a few 
businesses benefitted to a large extent.  Some of those businesses were reported to have over-
invested to accommodate the construction boom, with bankruptcy following.  Others, benefitting 
from local content expenditures or CCAs, have expanded agricultural holdings or invested in 
property in other parts of the state, such as the Brisbane metro region or in a vacation property on 
the coast. 
This local investment is additional to royalty schemes and taxes that accrue to state government, 
such as the UK SWF. Some would see the range of spending in the region by the CSG companies, 
which has been reported annually, as generous and as due recognition that those who bear the 
burdens of CSG developments must be, and are being, compensated with benefits.  However, 
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whether this local spend reaches a balance considered as “distributive justice” hinges on matters of 
scale and actual distribution. Which sectors, and which actors, in the community benefit and how 
long does the benefit last? One can also question the extent to which that benefit is passed on 
within the community, or whether it is invested outside of the region.  In Australia, attempts have 
been made to redress the imbalances, and reporting indeed showed economic benefits (CCSG 2017).  
However, there is evidence to suggest that these near-term results may only be temporary.  
Opportunities to harness the short period of intense investment (during the CSG construction 
period) appear to have been missed by a lack of coordinated vision and forward planning at 
company, local, and state government scales. One can thus see strategies toward achieving 
distributional justice in both jurisdictions. However, the Queensland experience, in particular, 
illustrates a measure of neglect of certain dynamics and some inherent economic and political 
mechanisms by which a “balanced” distribution can be frustrated.
4. Conclusion
A review of experiences of unconventional gas development in England, UK and Queensland, 
Australia in terms of procedural fairness and distributive justice reveal similarities and differences. 
The two countries have similar expectations about good governance and balancing the rights of 
private landholders with development that can be seen to be in the broader national interest.  We 
noted how issues around distributive justice appear to invoke engagement processes that respect 
concerns for procedural fairness.  That is, a range of interests are involved to varying degrees in both 
determining whether gas development proceeds and in allocating proceeds of development within 
communities where it does go forward.  We have also identified elements of procedural fairness 
designed into mechanisms that are aimed to achieve distributional justice. 
6.1 Key differences between England, UK and Queensland, Australia
In addition to the similarities noted, we have identified subtle but important differences, particularly 
around:
1. Who controls land use planning and decision-making differs. In the UK, powers have been given 
to local governments to approve unconventional gas development. These powers seem to be 
subject to being revoked if local planning decisions are not seen to be in the national interest). In 
Queensland, where onshore gas development is proceeding, priority development areas are 
designated by the state, with little influence at the local level on whether production proceeds. 
2. The level of central government control over the scale and pace of exploration and development 
in licensing models is another area of difference.  In the UK, development can be slowed or sped 
up as required.  In Queensland, market forces determine the scale and pace of development.  
That has had implications for procedural fairness – with the level of CSG activity appearing to be 
beyond any formal local influence.  This lack of control can be seen to have created additional 
‘stress’ for landholders and affected communities.
3. The balance between individual and collective rights in relation to protecting aspects of the local 
and global environment differs.  In the UK, discourse about shale gas development is framed as 
either economic prosperity or global climate change. In Australia, discourse about CSG 
development is less about any needed energy transition and more about local impacts, mainly 
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land access rights, perceived environmental impacts (e.g. risks to aquifers that farmers rely on), 
local social impacts, and potential health impacts. These impacts are seen as the local burdens of 
an export commodity, that others, far away benefit from. 
4. Mechanisms for working toward distributive justice differ.  These mechanisms are only in the 
conceptual stages in the UK.  In Australia, there is evidence of net economic gain from CSG 
development in Queensland.  That has resulted from employment of residents, annual payments 
specified by conduct and compensation agreements, local procurement, direct social 
investment, and the distribution of infrastructure grants received by local governments, which 
are funded by state government-collected resource royalties. However, whether such 
mechanisms have achieved “justice” in their distribution within communities and between 
affected communities and residents elsewhere in the state remains a matter for further 
investigation.
6.2 Context dependence
The unconventional gas development experience appears to be context dependant as England, UK 
and Queensland, Australia differ in their stages of gas development and in the maturity of regulatory 
responses. Commonalities in th  legal systems seem to present common concern  about the 
elements of procedural fairness and distributive justice examined i  this paper. However, the 
manifestations of these principles in local experiences in each country are not described by a simple 
narrative, nor by snap-shot baseline and impact studies. Experience to date echoes the conclusions 
of the many public inquiries, essentially, that unconventional gas development requires rigorous 
monitoring of social, economic and environmental performance. Data from Queensland suggest that  
such development must be tailored to suit local requirements, such as for workforce solutions for 
the near-term construction boom and longer term for economic sustainability in a region that has 
been losing its young adults via outward migration. In relation to addressing such challenges, 
Queensland, Australia, can be seen to be more advanced than England, UK in relation to their gas 
development. One can see the regulatory mechanisms that are in place as an experiment in the 
English common law system, an experiment that is yielding insight. This evidence suggests a need to 
refine the mechanisms tried to attempt to enhance procedural fairness and distributive justice.   
6.3 Remedies?
Whitton et al. (2015) proposed a conceptual framework for Social Sustainability as a mechanism by 
which to manage local conflict when considering land use and communities. Through this model, 
communities derive social priorities through “community visioning”. Residents convene to identify 
and debate community values, highlight current issues and future opportunities, and co-develop 
plans to achieve an agreed vision. This approach promotes democracy in shale gas decisions and 
public participation in energy decisions through dialogue between government, industry and local 
communities, which can enhance procedural fairness in shale gas decisions and advances an overall 
concept of fairness.  
However, such approaches face both practical and political challenges. For example, there is a 
tendency in practice to replace genuine engagement with “ticking the box” processes that lack 
development of a “learning dialogue” (Mercer-Mapstone, et al. 2017). Additionally, such processes 
can be seen to be aspirational, to be implemented in order to plan ahead rather than to redress 
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immediate problems. Human history suggests that strategies calling for extensive foresight or 
beginning with a blank slate can be less useful in practice than more heuristic approaches that deal 
with the mess that has been made already (Jacquet et al., 2018).  
We conclude that, in both settings, England, UK and Queensland, Australia the gas industry is still 
learning to be a “good neighbour”. An emphasis on the term “learning” can be seen as important as 
it does not imply an ideal state, but a process wherein lessons are gained that can be employed to 
improve the regulation of the industry. 
References
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). 2017. Regional Population Growth, Australia 2016. 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/3218.0 accessed 30 March 2018
Been, V. 1994. “Locally undesirable land uses in minority neighborhoods: Disproportionate siting or 
market dynamics?” Yale Law Journal 103, no. 6: 1383-422.
Bradshaw, M., and Waite C. 2017. “Learning from Lancashire: Exploring the contours of the shale gas 
conflict in England”. Global Environmental Change 47, no. C: 28-36.
Cavaye,  J.,  Kelly,  L.,  Martin,  M.,  Cameron,  D.,  Rillorta-Goloran,  T.,  Muriuki,  G., and  Baldwin,  S.  
2017.  “Two  industries  on  one  landscape”,  presentation  at  the  UQ/Agforce  Research  
Forum,  17  November,  Chinchilla.  The  University  of  Queensland. 
Centre for Coal Seam Gas (CCSG). 2017. 2017 Annual Report: Queensland Gasfields Annual 
Socioeconomic Report. The University of Queensland Centre for Coal Seam Gas. 
https://boomtown-indicators.org/2016-annual-report
Cotton M.D. 2016. “Fair fracking? Ethics and environmental justice in United Kingdom shale gas 
policy and planning.” Local Environment 22, no. 2: 185-202.
Cotton M.D. 2014. “Environmental Justice Challenges in United Kingdom Infrastructure Planning: 
Lessons from a Welsh Incinerator Project.” Environmental Justice 7, no. 2 (2014): 39-44 
CSIRO. 2016. Community attitudes towards CSG development: 2014 and 2016. Queensland. 
https://gisera.csiro.au/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/AttitudesToCSG_2ppFactsheet_WEB_170215.pdf
Cuppen, E. 2018. “The value of social conflicts. Critiquing invited participation in energy 
projects.”  Energy Research & Social Science 38: 28-32.
Curnow, K., Hunter, T., Weir, M., and Boulle, L. 2017. “Negotiation and regulation of land access 
agreements: lessons from Queensland.” The Journal of World Energy Law & Business 10, no. 
2: 117-35. 
DECC. 2014. Underground Drilling Access. London, UK: Department of Energy and Climate Change 
[online].
DECC. 2015 'Government defines Protected Areas for shale developments'. Department of Energy 
and Climate Change [online].
De Melo-Martín, I., Hays, J., and Finkel, M.L. 2014. “The role of ethics in shale gas policies.” Science 
of the Total Environment 470-471, no. C: 1114-119.
Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (DBEIS) 2018. Energy and Climate Change 
Public Attitudes Tracker (PAT): Wave 25 - summary report. 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/702640/Wave_25_Summary_Report.pdf
Espig, M., and de Rijke, K. 2016. Unconventional gas developments and the politics of risk and 
knowledge in Australia. Energy research & social science 20: 82-90.
Evensen, D. 2015. "Policy Decisions on Shale Gas Development ('fracking'): The Insufficiency of 
Science and Necessity of Moral Thought." Environmental Values 24, no. 4:511-34.
20
Evensen D. 2017. On the complexity of ethical claims related to shale gas policy. Local Environment: 
1-8.
Evensen D. and Stedman R. 2016. Scale matters: Variation in perceptions of shale gas development 
across national, state, and local levels. Energy Research and Social Science 20: 14-21.
Gillespie, N., Bond, C. J., Downs, V., and Staggs, J. 2016. Stakeholder trust in the Queensland CSG 
industry. The APPEA Journal, 56(1), 239-246.
Government H. 2015. The Onshore Hydraulic Fracturing (Protected Areas) Regulations 2015 (Draft 
Statutory Instruments - Petroleum). London, UK: The Stationary Office Ltd, 1-4.
House of Commons. 2016. “Comparison of the planning systems in the four UK countries.” Commons 
Library Briefing Paper 07459 20 January 2016. 
https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7459#fullreport
Hunt R.C. 1998. “Concepts of Property: Introduction of Tradition. In: Hunt RC and Gilman A (eds)”. 
Property in Economic Context. University Press of America, 3-28.
Hunter, T. 2014.” Law and policy frameworks for local content in the development of petroleum 
resources: Norwegian and Australian perspectives on cross-sectoral linkages and economic 
diversification.” Mineral Economics 27(2):115-126.
Innes, J., and Booher, D. 2004. “Reframing public participation: strategies for the 21st century.” 
Planning Theory & Practice 5(4):419-436.
Jacquet, J., and Kay, D. L. 2014. “The Unconventional Boomtown: Updating the impact model to fit 
new spatial and temporal scales.” Journal of Rural and Community Development, 9(1).
Keywood, M., Grant, S., Walton, A., Aylward, L., Rifkin, W., Witt, K., Kumar, A., and Williams, M. 
2018. “Human Health Effects of Coal Seam Gas Activity - A Study Design Framework.” Final 
report to  the  Gas Industry Social and Environmental Research Alliance  (GISERA). January 
2018. CSIRO, Canberra. https://gisera.csiro.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Health-1-Final-
Report.pdf 
Lacey, J., and Lamont, J. 2014. “Using social contract to inform social licence to operate: an 
application in the Australian coal seam gas industry.”  Journal of Cleaner Production, 84:831-
839.
Land Access Code 2016 (Queensland). Version 02. Department of Land Resources and Mines.  
http://www.slp.wa.gov.au.
Luke, H., Lloyd, D., Boyd, W., and Exter, K. 2014. “Unconventional gas development: Why a regional 
community said no.” Geographical Research, 52(3): 263-279.
Makki, M. 2015. Coal Seam Gas Development and Community Conflict: A Comparative Study of 
Community Responses to Coal Seam Gas Development in Chinchilla and Tara, Queensland. 
The University of Queensland.  
Mercer-Mapstone, L., Rifkin, W., Louis, W. R., and Moffat, K. 2018. “Company-Community Dialogue 
Builds Relationships, Fairness, and Trust Leading to Social Acceptance of Australian Mining 
Developments.” Journal of Cleaner Production 184: 671-77.
Mitchell, L., and Angus, D. 2016. “From good news for business to good news for the news business.” 
Unconventional Oil and Gas 3:35-39.
Moffat, K., and Zhang, A. 2014. “The paths to social licence to operate: An integrative model 
explaining community acceptance of mining.” Resources Policy 39(1): 61-70.
New South Wales Chief Scientist & Engineer. (2014). Final Report of the Independent Review of Coal 
Seam Gas Activities in NSW, Sydney: NSW Government.  
North, D., Stern, P., Webler, T., and Field, P. 2014. “Public and stakeholder participation for 
managing and reducing the risks of shale gas development.” Environ. Sci. Tech 48:8388–
8396.
The Scientific Inquiry into Hydraulic Fracturing in the Northern Territory. 2018.The Scientific Inquiry 
into Hydraulic Fracturing in the Northern Territory, Darwin: Government of the Northern 
Territory.  https://frackinginquiry.nt.gov.au/inquiry-reports/final-report
21
Owen, J.R., and Kemp, D. 2013. "Social Licence and Mining: A Critical Perspective." Resources 
Policy 38(1): 29-35.
QGC .2016. QGC Submission: Senate Select Committee on Unconventional Gas Mining. Brisbane: QGC 
-  https://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=67eb1302-c5e4-4c6f-b109-
705cc3cb0a4d 
Queensland Government, Department of State Development, Manufacturing, Infrastructure and 
Planning, (2017). ‘Strategic land use planning’. Canberra. 
https://www.statedevelopment.qld.gov.au/edq/strategic-land-use-planning.html
Rattle I, van Alstine, J., and Baker, T. 2018. “Shale gas development in England: a tale of two mineral 
planning authorities.” In: Whitton J, Cotton, M., Brasier, K, and Charnley-Parry, I.M. (ed) 
Governing Shale Gas: Development, Citizen Participation and Decision Making in the US, 
Canada, Australia and Europe. Routledge.
Ribot , J.C.,  and Peluso, N.L. 2003. “A Theory of Access.” Rural Sociology 68: 153-181.
Rifkin, W., Witt, K., Everingham, J. A., and Uhlmann, V. 2015. “Lessons CSG operators can learn from 
Southern Queensland towns.” Gas Today 31:76-79.
Schlager, E. and Ostrom, E. 1992. “Property Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual 
Analysis.” Land Economics 68:249-262.
Short,  D., and Szolucha,  A. 2017. “Fracking Lancashire: The planning process, social harm and 
collective trauma.” Geoforum.
Stokes, R. 2012. “Defining the ideology of public participation: ‘democracy, deliberation, devolution 
and dispute resolution’ and a new system for identifying public participation in planning 
law,” Macquarie Journal of International and Comparative Environmental Law 8(2): 1-20. 
Szolucha, A. 2018. “Assessing risk from fracking in the UK and Poland: The limits of robust regulation 
and responsible development.” In: Whitton J, Cotton, M., Brasier, K, and Charnley-Parry, I.M. 
(ed) Governing Shale Gas: Development, Citizen Participation and Decision Making in the US, 
Canada, Australia and Europe. Routledge.
Towler, B., Firouzi, M., Underschultz, J., Rifkin, W., Garnett, A., Schultz, H., Esternle, J., Tyson, S., and 
Witt, K. 2016. “An overview of the coal seam gas developments in Queensland.” Journal of 
Natural Gas Science and Engineering 31:249-271.
Treasury, H. 2016. Shale Wealth Fund: Consultation. In: Treasury HM (ed). London: Crown Copyright.
Trigger, D., Keenan, J., de Rijke, K., and Rifkin, W. 2014. “Aboriginal engagement and agreement-
making with a rapidly developing resource industry: coal seam gas development in 
Australia.” TheExtractive Industries and Society 1(2):176-188.
Turton, D. 2015. “Lawyers in Australia͛s coal seam gas debate: A study of participation in recorded 
community forums.” The Extractive Industries and Society 2: 802-812.   
UK. Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC). 2015. “Government defines Protected Areas 
for shale developments”. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-defines-
protected-areas-for-shale-developments.
Whitmarsh, L., Nash, N., Upham, P., Lloyd, A., Verdon, J.P., and Kendall, J.M. 2015. “UK public 
perceptions of shale gas hydraulic fracturing: The role of audience, message and contextual 
factors on risk perceptions and policy support.” Applied Energy 160: 419-430.
Whitton, J., Brasier, K., Charnley-Parry, I.M, Brasier, K., and Cotton, M.D. 2017. “Shale gas 
governance in the United Kingdom and the United States: Opportunities for public 
participation and the implications for social justice.” Energy Research & Social Science 26: 
11-22.
Whitton, J., Cotton, M.D., Brasier, K., and Charnley-Parry, I.M. 2018. “Introduction: Governing Shale 
Gas.” In: Whitton J, Cotton, M., Brasier, K, and Charnley-Parry, I.M. (ed) Governing Shale 
Gas: Development, Citizen Participation and Decision Making in the US, Canada, Australia 
and Europe. Routledge.
22
Whitton, J., Charnely-Parry,  I.M., Akiyoshi, M., and Lawless, W. 2015. “Conceptualizing a social 
sustainability framework for energy infrastructure decisions.” Energy Research & Social 
Science 8: 127-138.
Williams, L., Macnaghten, P., Davies, R., and Curtis, S. 2017. “Framing ‘fracking’: Exploring public 
perceptions of hydraulic fracturing in the United Kingdom.” Public Understanding of Science 
(Bristol, England) 26: 89-104.
